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Do Our Psychological Laws Apply Only to College Students?: External
Validity Revisited
Wolfgang Stroebea, Volker Gadenneb, and Bernard A. Nijstada
aUniversity of Groningen; bUniversity of Linz
ABSTRACT
That most psychological research is conducted with students led to concerns that psycho-
logical laws apply only to this population. These fears are based on Campbell and Stanley’s
concept of external validity that specifies the extent to which research findings can be gen-
eralized. This concept is based on an inductivist philosophy. As philosophers of science
have argued since Hume, one cannot derive general laws from singular observations.
Instead, one develops theories and uses empirical studies to test these theories. This solves
the problem of generalization because the domain of applicability is specified by the theory.
Reports that studies result in different findings when conducted in different cultures are
unproblematic as long as these differences can be explained with psychological theories.
There seems to be a growing concern in psychology
about the lack of diversity in the subject populations
on which we test our theories. For example, Henrich,
Heine, and Norenzayan (2010) criticized in a widely
cited article that “behavioral scientists routinely pub-
lish broad claims about human psychology and behav-
ior. based on samples drawn entirely from Western,
Educated, Industrialized, Rich, and Democratic
(WEIRD) societies” (p. 61). Arnett (2008) likewise
noted that most conclusions from psychological
research are based on American samples and that
conclusions that “apply to all human beings” have to
be “based on studies of diverse sectors of the human
population” (p. 602). It has even been suggested that
this lack of diversity may be at the root of our so-
called replication crisis.1 Thus, Simons, Yuichi, and
Lindsay (2017) argued that replication failures could
often be due to researchers failing to sample from the
same subject population that had been employed in
the original study. Along similar lines, Kitayama
(2017), as the incoming editor of Journal of
Personality and Social Psychology (Attitudes and Social
Cognition section), stated in his editorial that “if the
same effects occur in a sample that is very different
from the original one, this will constitute a ‘big plus’
that could bring the paper above the threshold for
publication in JPSP:ASC” (p. 359).
This renewed interest for the (lack of) diversity in
subject populations stems partly from cross-cultural
research showing that psychological findings often do
not generalize across cultures (e.g., Henrich et al.,
2010). It also partly stems from a sincere desire to
improve scientific practices within psychology, along
with more attention for statistical power, replication,
and transparency (e.g., Funder et al., 2014). For
example, referring to the replication crisis, Kitayama
(2017) noted, “Ultimately, I believe that this inten-
tional expansion of the subject base—not only in size
but also in diversity—in our science is the best step
toward addressing the challenges we face today” (p.
359). Despite these good intentions, in this article we
argue that the assumption that the populations on
which we test our theories need to be representative
of the population to which these theories are applied
is wrong. As a consequence, “blindly” (i.e., without
theory) replicating findings among different popula-
tions is likely a waste of resources.
The notion of external validity
The erroneous belief that, in scientific research, sub-
ject populations need to be “representative” has a long
tradition in scientific discourse but received methodo-
logical justification through the concept of external
validity. This concept was developed originally by
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Campbell in an article in Psychological Bulletin in
1957 but became popular through a little booklet enti-
tled “Experimental and Quasi-Experimental Designs
for Research” (Campbell & Stanley, 1966). This little
booklet—the reprint of a chapter that Campbell and
Stanley wrote for the Handbook of Research on
Teaching (Gage, 1963)—was one of the most influen-
tial methodological contributions to psychological
research ever published. It constituted compulsory
reading for generations of graduate students. Partly
due to its accessible writing, it probably contributed
more to the improvement of research in the social sci-
ences than any other methodological publication.
Campbell and Stanley (1966) popularized the dis-
tinction between two types of validity, namely,
internal validity and external validity. They stated that
internal validity is the basic minimum without which
any experiment is uninterpretable: Did in fact the
experimental treatments make a difference in this
specific experimental instance? External validity asks
the question of generalizability: To what populations,
settings, treatment variables, and measurement
variables can this effect be generalized? (Campbell &
Stanley, 1966, p. 5)
The fact that the booklet is a reprint of a chapter
written for a handbook on education research is
important because their discussion of external validity
has to be understood in the context of applied
research, where, as we argue next, external validity is
more relevant than for theory testing. Campbell and
Stanley (1966) did not even mention problems
involved in basing general laws2 on studies of college
students, an issue that later became the main focus of
this discussion. Even though the unease with the lack
of diversity in the research that participants studied in
psychological research predates the Campbell and
Stanley (1963/1966) treatise, the need for external val-
idity has often been used as justification for the cri-
tique that psychology, and particularly social
psychology, had become the science of the American
college student and that psychological laws might not
be valid outside this limited population (e.g., Arnett,
2008; Henrich et al., 2010; Simons et al., 2017).
The problem with the concept of external validity is
that it is based on inductivist principles. According to
the first inductivist principle, general statements (laws,
theories) are generated by deriving them from observa-
tion statements, usually by generalizing the results of a
limited set of observations. The second inductive prin-
ciple states that a general statement formed this way
can be considered as proven, if the number of observa-
tions is sufficiently great, a variety of cases were
observed, and no observation statement contradicted
the general statement. Under these conditions, the
inference from the observation statement to the general
statement is regarded as valid or justified.
The first inductive principle is unproblematic,
because it is concerned only with the question of how
to generate theories, not with their truth or justifica-
tion. Induction may be used as a heuristic for theory
building. The usefulness of induction for that purpose
is, however, controversial: Some consider it as very
useful, but others point out that explanatory theories,
which refer to unobservable structures and processes,
can hardly be created by generalizing observable states
of affairs. But we need not discuss this here, as the
problem of induction is not mainly associated with
the formation of theories.
It is the second principle that was famously
criticized by Hume (1748; see also Popper, 1959). An
inference from singular statements to a general
statement cannot be founded on deductive logic.
Moreover, the attempt to justify induction by arguing
that induction has proved successful in the past is cir-
cular. An inference from past success to future success
is itself an inductive inference. Popper also demon-
strated that the same problem arises if the inductive
inference or its conclusion is only claimed as probable.
As a result of this criticism, scientific theories can
never be proven to be true or probable. A theory can
get confirmation (or support) from observations, how-
ever, only of observations that are the result of tests
that could have refuted the theory at stake, not from
observations that gave rise to its very formulation.3
Furthermore, external validity and the associated
idea of generalizability are concerned not only with
the formation of general statements but also with their
truth or justification. The concept of validity clearly
indicates that some generalizations are regarded as
valid, whereas others are not. But how could a gener-
alization be valid? If Hume’s argument is sound, one
can simply never generalize research findings in a
sample to a population, or in a specific population to
other populations. In other words, when a researcher
finds a specific relation between two variables, it is
never possible to logically prove that this relation will
also hold in a different population (or when using dif-
ferent operationalizations of the variables involved).
That the concept of external validity is based on a
faulty inductivist philosophy of science has been rec-
ognized and severely criticized soon after the
Campbell and Stanley (1966) publication (Calder,
Phillips, & Thybout, 1982; Gadenne, 1976; Kruglanski
& Kroy, 1973; Mook, 1983). The remarkable aspect of
these publications is not only their strong reservations
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about the construct of external validity but also the
fact that these authors developed their arguments
independent of one another. For example, Mook
(1983) flatly argued that the statement that “the selec-
tion of designs strong in both types of validity is obvi-
ously our ideal” (Campbell & Stanley, 1966, p. 5) is
wrong. Instead, he argued, when testing theories, one
is not even interested in generalizability: It is not
important whether specific findings are also found
among other populations; what is important is draw-
ing valid conclusions about a theory given the empir-
ical evidence. Along similar lines, Calder et al. wrote,
It seems self-evident to many researchers, for
instance, that having a random sample from some
larger population is a better test than employing a
convenience (e.g., student) sample. Yet much of this
superficial plausibility disappears on closer inspection.
The reason is that theories are stated at a universal
level. As long as a sample is relevant to the universe
of the theory, it constitutes a test of that theory.
(p. 241)
Even Cook and Campbell (1979) expressed some
doubts about the importance of external validity for
theory-testing research. In their follow-up of
Campbell and Stanley (1966) treaty, they wrote, “The
priority among validity types varies with the kind of
research being conducted. … Few theories specify
crucial target settings, populations, or times across
which generalization is desired. Consequently, external
validity is of relatively little importance” (p. 83).
However, even though they agreed that it is less
important in theory-testing research, they could not
quite abandon they idea that it is at least of some
importance: “For investigators with theoretical inter-
ests our estimate is that the types of validity, in order
of importance, are probably internal, construct, statis-
tical, and external validity” (p. 83).
The fact that this confusion on an issue that is cen-
tral to psychological research is still alive justifies a
renewed discussion of the question of generalizability
and external validity. Such a discussion seems particu-
larly timely, because recent findings from cross-cul-
tural psychology have created new doubts about the
general validity of psychological theories (Henrich
et al., 2010).
Psychology as the study of college students:
Subject selection bias in
psychological research
Complaints about the lack of diversity in the populations
of research participants used in psychological experiments
have a long tradition. Probably the first psychologist to
make that point was McNemar (1946), who, in an article
on opinion-attitude methodology, argued that
the existing science of human behavior is largely the
science of the behavior of sophomores. Too much
research effort is expended on college students with
subsequent waste of journal space devoted to
speculation concerning whether the findings hold for
mankind in general. (p. 333)
In retrospect, McNemar’s complaint seems prema-
ture, because even in 1949 the proportion of studies
with undergraduate participants published in the Journal
of Abnormal and Social Psychology was only 20%. It had
doubled to 49% by 1959 (Christie, 1965) and rose to
73% by 1962 to 1964 (Smart, 1966). Because the major-
ity of these student subjects were male, Smart (1966)
concluded that “the male college student has become
the ‘white rat’ of human experimentation” (p. 115).
Smart could have added “American” to this description,
because in an analysis of articles published from 2003 to
2007 in six journals of the American Psychological
Association, Arnett (2008) found that approximately
80% of research participants were American. Although
there was little change in this situation during the last
century (Wintre, North, & Sugar, 2001), the advance of
Amazon.com’s Mechanical Turk (MTurk) and other
online sources (e.g., Prolific Academic) has made other
easily accessible subject pools available (Paolacci &
Chandler, 2014). Although the use of MTurk will
increase the diversity of research participants taking part
in a study, individuals who earn money by serving as
participants in psychological studies are likely to repre-
sent an atypical slice of humanity.
The unease with basing psychological laws on stud-
ies of the small minority of individuals who attend
college has been justified with arguments that these
students are relatively exceptional (and homogeneous)
in many characteristics that are associated with psy-
chological factors, such as age, social class, and learn-
ing ability (Smart, 1966). The most elaborated critique
was published by Sears (1986) in the Journal of
Personality and Social Psychology. He argued that
research on the full life span suggests that, compared
with older adults, college students are likely to have
less crystallized attitudes, less formulated senses of
self, stronger cognitive skills, stronger tendencies to
comply with authority, and more unstable peer group
relationships. The laboratory setting is likely to
exaggerate all these differences. These peculiarities of
social psychology’s predominant data base may have
contributed to central elements of its portrait of
human nature. (p. 515)
A few decades later, Henrich et al. (2010) presented
data from cross-cultural research that demonstrated
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that many findings based on Western participants
cannot be replicated with non-Westerners. Even such
basic perceptual effects as the M€uller-Lyer visual illu-
sion were different for Western as compared to non-
Western participants.
To summarize, until very recently the overwhelm-
ing proportion of psychological studies was based on
college student participants, most of them studying at
U.S. universities. This situation has changed with the
rise of crowdsourced subject pools such as Amazon’s
MTurk. But although the recent surge in use of
MTurk samples has increased diversity, it arguably
did not improve representativeness. Finally, research
suggests that many psychological findings may not
generalize to other cultures. This state of affairs has
led some to propose that psychology needs to diver-
sify its subject populations. We argue, however, that
this is a misconception, based on erroneous inductiv-
ist logic: Diversification of subject populations does
not make experimental findings more externally valid.
Inductivist strategies to derive general laws
from experimental observations
In discussing factors jeopardizing external validity,
Campbell and Stanley (1966) were aware of the fact
that this concept was problematic. They warned that a
caveat was in order that introduced
some painful problems in the science of induction.
The problems are painful because of a recurrent
reluctance to accept Hume’s truism that induction or
generalization is never fully justified logically.
Whereas the problems of internal validity are solvable
within the limits of the logic of probability statistics,
the problems of external validity are not logically
solvable in any neat, conclusive way. (p. 17)
Even though the ideas developed in Campbell and
Stanley (1966) were further expanded by Cook and
Campbell (1979) and Shadish, Cook, and Campbell
(2002), their refinement of the concept of validity
failed to amend the basic flaw of the concept of exter-
nal validity, namely, that it is based on an inductivist
philosophy of science.
The reservation even Campbell and Stanley (1966)
themselves appeared to harbor with regard to the con-
cept of external validity did not prevent others from
forging into the unknown, suggesting strategies that
in their opinion would solve the problem. A first sug-
gestion that has been proposed is to use samples that
are (more) representative of the (world) population.
For example, Arnett (2008) argued in an article pub-
lished in American Psychologist that “research on the
whole of humanity is necessary for creating a science
that truly represents the whole of humanity” (p. 603).
Similarly, Aronson, Wilson, and Akert (2005) sug-
gested in their widely used textbook that “the only
way to be certain that the results of an experiment
represent the behavior of a particular population is to
ensure that the participants are randomly selected
from that population” (p. 45). They admitted that this
approach would not be practical but added that
“concerns about practicality and expense are not good
excuses for doing poor science” (p. 46).
Apart from being unpractical, the concept of a rep-
resentative sample makes sense only if a certain popu-
lation is finite (e.g., the current population of the
United States). If psychologists want to establish laws
that apply to all of humanity, which they may typic-
ally aim for, they should be aware of the fact that “all
of humanity” is not a finite population, because is
also includes past and future generations.
Furthermore, as suggested by Stroebe and Nijstad
(2009), in a critical response to Arnett (2008), average
results found with such “representative” samples
might not apply to most members of that population.
Suppose a researcher was interested in the impact of
one-sided versus two-sided communications without
realizing that the effect is moderated by intelligence
(i.e., one-sided communications have more impact
with less intelligent people, two-sided communications
have more impact with more intelligent individuals;
Hovland, Lumsdaine & Sheffield, 1949). If that
researcher did the study with a representative sample
of the U.S. population, the result would be a null
effect, a finding that would not be true for most
members of the population studied. Thus, in the
absence of good theory about relevant population
characteristics, even representative samples do not
necessarily lead to more valid conclusions about pop-
ulations than convenience samples.
As a second—and less cumbersome—solution,
Henrich et al. (2010) suggested that universities
should invest in creating “non-student subject pools—
for example, by setting up permanent psychological
and behavioral testing facilities in bus terminals,
Fijian villages, rail stations, airports, and anywhere
diverse where subjects might find themselves with
extra time” (p. 82). In other words, replace subject
pools representative of students, with pools represen-
tative of bus, rail and airplane travelers, or at least
those subsection of travelers destined for stations or
airports near the university.
For social psychologists, the use of such diverse
samples would also cause problems for the operation-
alization of their independent variables, because
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manipulations are assumed to create the same social
condition for all participants. For example, in a study
of attitude change, one has to use messages that argue
a position with which most subjects are likely to dis-
agree; otherwise there can be no attitude change. If
such a study were conducted at a bus terminal, train
station, or airport, it would be difficult to predict the
original attitudinal position of the potential respond-
ents. When social psychologists operationalize a theor-
etical variable, they need a homogenous population to
be certain that their manipulation reflects the same
variable in all their subjects. This is already problem-
atic when studies are replicated with student partici-
pants of a different nationality or of the same
nationality a decade later (Stroebe & Strack, 2014).
But the task would be impossible with randomly
chosen travelers or a random sample of a population
(see also Baumard & Sperber, 2010, for a similar cri-
tique of cross-cultural studies).
Instead of attempting to increase external validity
by increasing the diversity of participant samples,
Simons et al. (2017) suggested a third, but equally
problematic, solution. They proposed that empirical
manuscripts should include a statement of the
Constraints on Generality (COG) as a declaration that
“explicitly identifies and justifies the target popula-
tions for the reported findings.” This COG statement
is meant to justify all claims of generality for the par-
ticipants of the study, the stimulus materials, the
experimental procedures, and the historical context in
which the study was conducted. Specifically, the repre-
sentativeness of these elements for the populations to
which the findings are being generalized should be
made explicit, on the basis of either empirical data or
theoretical predictions. For example, researchers have
to explain if the sample of experimental participants is
representative for “all psychology undergraduates, all
undergraduates in the United States, all adults, or
even all mammals.” According to the authors, the
inclusion of COG statements will decrease the chance
that the author’s claim will be proven to be
“embarrassingly” more limited than originally implied,
it will increase the likelihood that subsequent replica-
tions by other researchers will be successful, and it
will inspire follow-up studies.
Quite apart from the fact that, as we argue next,
such statements are superfluous in theory-testing
research, they would also be impossible to make.
Suppose we demonstrated a particular finding among
students at the University of Groningen. How would
we know whether students at the University of
Groningen are representative of all Dutch students?
This issue has never been studied empirically, and
given the weather conditions in Groningen, it is quite
possible that students there differ in some way from,
say, students in the southerly town of Maastricht,
which enjoys a more clement climate. And Dutch
psychology students are likely to differ from German
students, who must have an excellent grade point
average to be admitted to psychology, whereas there is
no such selection in the Netherlands. But even if we
demonstrated that our results could be replicated with
student samples all over the Netherlands and
Germany, the question would arise whether this causal
effect would also hold for less educated or for older
people or for other communicators, other communi-
cations, other attitude issues, and other methods of
measuring attitudes.
Our discussion illustrates the problems of induc-
tion. As Popper (1959, Chapter 1) argued with refer-
ence to Hume (1748), it is impossible to derive
general laws from singular observations. The problem
cannot be solved by using representative samples of
the world population or, on a smaller scale, travelers
in bus stations, train stations, or airports. Fortunately,
as we argue next, hypothetico-deductivism provides a
workable solution to this problem.
When is representativeness of
samples important?
Although representativeness of samples is not import-
ant for theory-testing research, it can be important for
many forms of applied research. For example, in sur-
vey research, where researchers attempt to determine
the percentage of members of a population that has a
particular characteristic (e.g., holds a particular atti-
tude, intends to vote for a particular candidate, or buy
a particular product), representativeness of samples is
important. Such questions do not concern laws of
causal relations but simple facts: One wants to assess
how certain features are distributed in a population
that is finite but too large for a complete survey. For
such questions, one needs a sample that is representa-
tive in the sense that the relevant feature is distributed
in the sample approximately as it is in the population.
Random sampling is one of the means for that purpose.
We may speak here of statistical representativeness.
Representativeness is also important in experimen-
tal research that addresses certain applied issues. If
researchers are interested in whether a particular
treatment intervention is effective for a specific
target population, they must test this intervention
with respondents who are representative for this
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target population. For example, in studies of con-
sumer research one might be interested in the effectiv-
ity of a specific advertisement. It is therefore
important in such studies that the impact of that
advertisement is tested with the same type of individ-
uals that form the target group for the advertisement.
For this reason, the fact that Campbell and Stanley
(1966) intended their analysis for education research-
ers is highly relevant for their conceptualization of
external validity, a point also made by Mook (1983).
It is important to note, however, that the distinc-
tion between applied and theory-testing research does
not refer to mutually exclusive categories, because
applied research can also be theory testing. If a par-
ticular intervention has been derived from a theory,
an intervention design can be used to assess the valid-
ity of that theory. For example, intervention studies
were used to test a medical theory about the causes of
obesity developed by the science journalist Gary
Taubes (2011). He rejected the “energy in/energy out”
model of obesity and suggested that obesity was
caused not by an imbalance of calorie intake relative
to energy output but by the consumption of the wrong
calories, namely, carbohydrates rather than fat.
Carbohydrates are the main driver of insulin secre-
tion. If carbohydrate intake is restricted, insulin secre-
tion falls and fat cells will release fatty acids resulting
in weight loss. If this theory were valid, obese individ-
uals put on a calorie-restricted low carbohydrate/high
fat diet would be more likely to lose weight than
obese individuals put on a high carbohydrate/low fat
diet that contains the same calories (i.e., isocaloric).
However, this theory was not supported in (applied)
intervention studies (e.g., Foster et al., 2010; Naude
et al., 2014). Thus, the decisive difference with regard
to the need of representativeness of samples is not
between theory testing and applied research but
between research that tests theories and causal rela-
tions and research that does not (i.e., surveys and
atheoretical intervention studies).
For the sake of argument, let us assume that
Taubes’s (2011) theory were valid for half of humanity
but invalid for the other half. If half of humanity
would gain weight on a diet rich in carbohydrates but
low on fat, whereas for the other half a diet high in
fat but low in carbohydrates would result in weight
gain, then both types of diet would result in similar
weight gain, if applied indiscriminately to—and aver-
aged across—both types of human beings. However,
what would be wrong here would not be the empirical
study but the theory being tested. Taubes’s assump-
tion that his theory applied to all of humanity would
be false and the theory would need to be refined as to
which part of humanity it applied.
This is also a good example for demonstrating
how the failure to support a theory could result in
theoretical improvements. For example, if Taubes
had conducted these studies himself, he might have
used the empirical data to test for potential modera-
tors. The elegant way would be to do this theory-
guided. But less elegantly, he could also divide the
samples into participants who lost weight with a
given diet and those who gained weight with that
diet. If such characteristics were found, one could
incorporate them as moderators into the original the-
ory. However, one would then have to conduct a fur-
ther study to test this enriched theory with a new
sample of participants.
The history of social psychology is full of examples
of theories that have been modified in the light of
inconsistent findings. For example, the theory of rea-
soned action (Fishbein & Ajzen, 1975) was developed
in response to a devastating report by Wicker (1969)
that attitudes were poor predictors of behavior. The
elaboration likelihood model (Petty & Cacioppo,
1986) was developed to explain various inconsistencies
in the attitude change literature that seemed to be
related to differences in recipient involvement or issue
knowledge. Finally, the incorporation of negativity of
consequences (Cooper & Worchel, 1970) and freedom
of choice (Linder, Cooper, & Jones, 1967) into disson-
ance theoretical explanations of the consequences of
insufficient reward for counterattitudinal behavior was
motivated by repeated failures to replicate the original
Festinger and Carlsmith (1959) findings. In each case,
the amended theories were then tested in new experi-
mental studies that manipulated the assumed modera-
tors. It is important to note, however, that none of
these inconsistencies was discovered while replicating
studies in airports, bus terminals, or Fijian villages.
Beyond representativeness and external
validity: The hypothetico-deductive approach
Theories consist of a number of abstract concepts that
reflect theoretical constructs and of hypotheses about
the relationship between these constructs. If one tests
predictions derived from a general theory, there is no
problem of generalization and external validity,
because the theory defines the population to which it
applies. With psychological theories the assumption is
usually that they apply to all human beings. This
assumption is typically implicit and can be inferred
from the fact that the theory does not specify a
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particular subgroup of humanity to which it applies.
For example, the frustration-aggression hypothesis of
Dollard, Doob, Miller, Mowrer, and Sears (1939)
assumed that frustration was the sole antecedent of
aggression in all human beings. In testing that the-
ory, one examines whether a causal relationship
exists between the two theoretical variables frustra-
tion and aggression.
The abstract concepts that constitute a psycho-
logical theory are unobservable variables. To be able
to test the theory empirically, these unobservable the-
oretical concepts have to be operationalized, that is,
translated into observable terms in empirical hypoth-
eses. In experiments designed to test whether frustra-
tion leads to aggression, frustration might be
operationalized by having participants receive a nega-
tive evaluation from another person (confederate) on
a task they had just performed, and aggression may
be measured by giving the frustrated participant the
opportunity to deliver some noxious stimulus to the
frustrator (e.g., an electric shock). These assumptions
that link unobservable theoretical concepts to empir-
ical manipulations or measures are “auxiliary hypoth-
eses” (Gadenne, 1984; Trafimow, 2012) that can
themselves be true or false.
Unlike education researchers who in their applied
research are interested in whether a particular type of
training will improve a particular type of learning,
researchers testing the frustration-aggression hypoth-
esis are not interested in the determinants of the
delivery of electric shocks. They are interested in
whether frustration results in aggression, and they
assume that their operationalization of the independ-
ent variable actually reflects the theoretical concept
(i.e., frustration) they were trying to manipulate and
that the dependent variable measured the concept
(i.e., aggression) they were attempting to assess. Thus,
the validity of theory-testing research depends not
only on the internal validity of the experimental pro-
cedures but also on the validity of the experimenters’
auxiliary hypotheses (Trafimow, 2012) that guided
them in developing their operationalizations.
If experimental subjects, who have been frustrated,
deliver more (or more severe) electric shocks to the
frustrator than subjects who were not frustrated, the
hypothesis is confirmed. There will be no question of
generalization, because the theory specified the class
of people to whom it applies, namely, “all of human-
ity.” Thus, the method of theory testing solves the
problem of generalization. “We can gain general
knowledge by testing theories. Such knowledge
consists of the theories that have been confirmed”
(Gadenne, 2013, p. 6).
This does not mean, however, that such confirm-
ation proves a theory to be true. As Popper (1959)
argued, a theory can never be proven true. One reason
for this is that there is always the possibility that
researchers’ auxiliary hypotheses were invalid or that,
due to deficits in experimental control, third variables
were responsible for the observed relationship between
the variables manipulated or measured in a study.
Nevertheless, a theory can be more or less well-sup-
ported depending on the number of strict empirical
tests the theory has successfully undergone (Gadenne,
1984, 2013; Popper, 1959).
For the same reason, however, failure of a single
experiment to support a hypothesis does not falsify a
theory. If experimental subjects, who have been frus-
trated, fail to deliver more (or more severe) electric
shocks to the frustrator than subjects who were not
frustrated, one can always argue that the frustration
manipulation failed to induce frustration or that the
delivery of electric shocks was not a good measure of
aggression. Such criticism has repeatedly been raised
against most of experimental aggression research (e.g.,
Ritter & Eslea, 2005; Tedeschi & Quigley, 1996).
However, even though the failure of one empirical
study to support a theoretical prediction does not fals-
ify a theory, repeated failure does raise serious doubts.
One possibility of salvaging the theory is to more
clearly specify the conditions under which a theoret-
ical prediction would be supported (Trafimow, 2009).
Examples for this in social psychology have been
described earlier (e.g., Cooper & Worchel, 1970;
Linder, Cooper, & Jones, 1967). Theories are aban-
doned only if better theories are developed that have
higher empirical content. Such theories need to
explain all the findings of the ones they replace
(including those that are inconsistent with that the-
ory) but also make additional predictions that could
not be derived from the original theory.
In contrast to this hypothetico-deductive approach,
the criticism of Henrich et al. (2010) seems to be
based on an inductivist theory of science that assume
that we generalize from the empirical findings to real-
ity rather than deriving interpretations of reality from
our theories. In a section criticizing that researchers
often assume that their findings are universal, they
argue, “Sampling from a thin slice of humanity would
be less problematic if researchers confined their inter-
pretations to the populations from which they sample”
(p. 63). As we pointed out in the previous section,
in theory-testing research such a restriction is
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unnecessary: The aim is not to generalize but to test
whether an effect that is predicted by the theory does
actually occur. This is fortunate, because if the find-
ings of our research would apply only to college stu-
dents, the science of psychology would be useless for
explaining the behavior of most of humanity and
applications of psychological science to consumer,
health, or economic behavior would be futile.
Can diversity be useful in theory testing?
We argued earlier that conducting theory-testing
research in bus terminals, train stations, or airports or
on representative samples of the world population is
not very informative. If we find that our experimental
results are the same with bus travelers as with university
students, we would still not know whether our findings
would also generalize to travelers passing through the
local airport or through a different bus terminal. And if
the experiment worked with university students but not
with bus travelers or passengers passing through the
local airport, one would not know why this was the
case. Was it because travelers are older or less educated
than university students? Or was it that some travelers
did not understand the experimental instructions? Or
perhaps that they were under stress, because they did
not want to miss their bus or flight and were therefore
less involved in the experiment than university students,
who participated in their free time?
And yet, replicating experimental findings with var-
ied samples can be useful if the selection of these sam-
ples is theory guided. After all, the assumption that a
theory applies to all human beings is as much a testable
hypothesis as the assumption that the auxiliary hypothe-
ses that guided the operationalizations of theoretical
constructs were valid. The important point here is that
it is irrelevant whether aspects of the experimental situ-
ation are representative of “reality” (i.e., external valid-
ity) but whether they are valid empirical translations of
the corresponding terms in the theoretical proposition
under investigation. And as this correspondence
assumption can be questioned with regard to the auxil-
iary hypotheses guiding the operationalization of theor-
etical variables, one can also ask whether college
students are representative of humankind.
However, any challenge to the correspondence
assumption would have to be theory specific. Thus, as
one would ask in a test of the frustration-aggression
hypothesis whether delivering electric shocks to
another person is an optimal operationalization of
aggressive behavior (i.e., a good representation of this
theoretical construct), one could ask whether college
students are representative of humankind with regard
to the theoretical hypothesis being tested. This last
aspect—that the difference has to be related to the
research question being tested—is important, because
it does not matter that college students are WEIRD,
as long as their WEIRDness does not affect the theor-
etically predicted relation that is being tested.
Is cross-cultural research the answer?
Cross-cultural research would seem to provide the
appropriate method to assuage doubts about the
assumed universality of our psychological laws.
However, like research involving travelers in bus ter-
minals or airports, cross-cultural research is rarely
informative unless researchers have specific hypothe-
ses why the relationship between the theoretical con-
cepts should differ between cultures or nations. The
blind repetition of theory-testing research in different
countries or different cultures is a futile exercise. If an
experimental finding were replicated in some coun-
tries/cultures, but not in others, it would be difficult
to know whether the problem was due to the invalid-
ity of the universality assumption or to a failure to
create the same experimental conditions across the
different countries/cultures.
This would be less of a problem with simple per-
ception studies such people’s susceptibility to the well-
known Mueller-Lyer illusion (i.e., participants who are
shown a stylized arrow and are asked to place a mark
on the midpoint of the figure, tend to place it more
toward the tail end). When Rivers (1901) demon-
strated that Murray islanders were less susceptible to
the illusion than Europeans, he explained the differ-
ence with the assumption that Europeans live in more
“carpentered” environments characterized by straight
lines, right angles, and square corners than Murray
islanders. This conclusion was later challenged by G.
Jahoda (1971), who compared members of an African
tribe, who lived either in a traditional rural environ-
ment or in African cities. He found no meaningful
difference between these two groups and suggested
that differences in retinal pigmentation between
Europeans and dark-skinned people could be respon-
sible for the differences in their susceptibility to the
optical illusion. However, this interpretation was later
refuted by Berry (1968), who compared Samples of
Eskimos of Baffin Island and Temne of Sierra Leone,
who lived in either a traditional or a moderately car-
pentered environment, and found for both groups
that they showed more susceptibility to the Mueller-
Lyer illusion if they lived in a more carpentered
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environment. This research demonstrates that even
with such simple stimuli and a relatively clear theoret-
ical interpretation, testing this explanation cross-cul-
turally is a complex task.
But as shown by the “cross-cultural experiments on
threat and rejection,” conducted by the “Organization
for Comparative Social Research” and directed by
Stanley Schachter as research coordinator, findings of
cross-cultural research become uninterpretable with
complex social situations and in the absence of clear
theoretical predictions (Schachter et al., 1954). This
group of researchers wanted to examine whether the
original findings on rejection of deviates in group set-
tings reported by Schachter (1951) could be replicated
in seven countries, namely, Netherlands, Sweden,
France, Norway, Belgium, Germany, and England.
Even though conditions for this research were opti-
mal, the result was a resounding failure. Manipulation
checks showed that some or all of the experimental
manipulations were unsuccessful in three of the seven
locations (England, Belgium, and Germany). But even
in the countries in which the manipulations appeared
to have worked, their impact on the sociometric rat-
ings differed widely: The Norwegian results were dis-
tinctly different from those of the Dutch, Swedish,
and French experiments. Schachter et al. (1954) sug-
gested a number of alternative interpretation for this
inconsistency: “(a) The Norwegian results are attribut-
able to experimental artifacts. (b) There are cultural
differences between Norway and the other three coun-
tries. (c) The relationship among our variables is
more complex than we originally thought” (p. 429).
Given these rather discouraging findings, it is not
surprising that this was the only cross-cultural experi-
ment attempted by the Organization for Comparative
Social Research. Yet there is an important lesson to be
learnt from this failure. As Roberts (1970) concluded
in a review of cross-cultural studies:
This study points to an important problem. When
experimental replications in foreign lands obtain the
same results as the original work, there is little difficulty
in interpretation. When the results differ, and the
strategy cannot be replicated across national boundaries,
there is little hope of interpretation, particularly when
we have no clear definition of culture. (p. 338)
In the meantime, mainly due to the dimensional
approach to culture first promoted by Hofstede
(1980), we have information about differences
between cultures that are likely to be of relevance for
individual behavior. Hofstede originally identified
four dimension of culture— individualism-collectiv-
ism, power distance, uncertainty avoidance, and
cultural masculinity-femininity—that provide an
organizing structure that allows one to describe cul-
tures. Of these dimensions, the individualism-collect-
ivism dimension has had the strongest impact on
research on cultural psychology (Smith, 2010), espe-
cially after researchers elaborated the variation in psy-
chological processes along this dimension. Compared
to members of individualistic countries, members of
collectivist countries hold different construals of self,
others, and the interdependence of the two (Markus
& Kitayama, 1991). Members of individualistic coun-
tries such as the United States, the United Kingdom,
or the Netherlands think of themselves as autonomous
individuals. They tend to prefer independent relation-
ships with others and to subordinate the goals of their
in-groups to their own personal goals. In collectivistic
countries such as China or Korea, people tend to think
of themselves as members of their groups and to prefer
interdependent relationships to others and to subordin-
ate their personal goals to those of their in-groups.
Related to these cultural variations in social orientation
are variations in cognitive style along the analytic-holis-
tic dimension. Nisbett, Peng, Choi, and Norenzayan
(2001) proposed that members of Western nations pro-
cess information in an analytic way, identifying the key
elements in a situation and ascribing causality to focal
actors. In contrast, members of Asian countries process
information in a holistic way, paying attention to the
total perceptual field and the relationship between all
the elements in that field.
These differences are important because the coun-
tries in which most psychological research is being
conducted (United States, United Kingdom, the
Netherlands, and Germany) are among the most indi-
vidualistic countries (Hofstede, 1980). They also allow
us to identify certain areas of psychological research
where experimental findings might differ between
individualist and collectivist cultures. A great deal of
cross-cultural research has confirmed these expecta-
tions (Kitayama & Cohen, 2007). The important dif-
ference between this new type of cross-cultural
research and studies like the one conducted by
Schachter et al. (1954) is that the former is theory
guided, whereas the latter was not. We now have
information about cultural differences that allow us to
derive hypotheses from psychological theories about
potential differences in findings of studies conducted
in these different cultures. Because a general review of
cultural psychology is beyond to scope of this article
(we refer the interested reader to Kitayama & Cohen,
2007), we discuss cultural differences with regard to
two paradigms to illustrate this approach.
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The Asch (1951) conformity paradigm is an experi-
mental situation that should be affected by the differ-
ences in social orientation between members of
individualistic and collectivist countries. The paradigm
assesses the influence of a unanimous majority on an
individual group member in a situation in which the
majority gives a false judgment. Because members of
collectivist countries prefer interdependent relation-
ships to others and are assumed to subordinate their
personal goals to those of their in-groups, one would
expect them to show more conformity than members
of individualistic countries. Indeed, in a meta-analysis
of 133 experiments, Bond and Smith (1996) found
that the rate of conformity was lower in individualistic
than collectivistic countries.
In view of the differences in cognitive style of
members of individualistic and collectivistic countries,
the correspondence bias (also referred to as the funda-
mental attribution error) is a phenomenon where one
would expect to observe cultural differences. The cor-
respondence bias refers to a tendency to ascribe to a
person an attitude that corresponds to that person’s
behavior, even when the behavior was clearly deter-
mined by the situation. Because members of collectiv-
ist nations are assumed to process information in a
holistic way, paying attention to the total perceptual
field and the relationship between all elements in that
field, one would assume that they are less likely to be
subject to the correspondence bias. This hypothesis
was supported by Choi and Nisbett (1998) in a study
with American and Korean subjects.
What can we conclude from these studies with
regard to the universality assumption of psychological
theories? Obviously, both the levels of conformity
observed in the Asch situation and the correspondence
bias varied across the countries or cultures studied. To
scientists taking an inductivist position, these cultural
differences would be a clear indication that psycho-
logical laws supported by studies with college students
do not apply to members of these other cultures. In
contrast, scientists taking a Popperian (1959) position
would not find these cultural differences problematic.
The important question from a hypothetico-deductive
perspective is not whether a phenomenon is invariant
across different cultures (i.e., a cultural universal) but
whether these differences can be explained by our psy-
chological theories. The fact that the results of these
cross-cultural studies supported the hypotheses of the
researchers who conducted these studies clearly sug-
gests that these cross-cultural differences could be pre-
dicted from psychological theories that were originally
developed in an individualistic culture and tested with
American undergraduate students.
Conclusions
The fact that one of the most influential methodo-
logical contributions to psychology was originally
written for a handbook of research on education may
have been responsible for a widespread confusion
about generalizability of research findings. The con-
cept of external validity introduced by Campbell and
Stanley (1966) for applied research in education was
interpreted as implying that general laws can be
derived from empirical observations. If that were cor-
rect, the fact that most psychological research is con-
ducted with samples of college students (or more
recently MTurk workers) would indeed call the whole
of scientific psychological knowledge into question.
In this article, we reminded our readers that this
type of inductivism has been rejected since Hume
(1748): Empirical findings among any type of popula-
tion can never be generalized to other populations.
Instead, empirical observations are used to test
hypotheses derived from theories, and it is the theo-
ries that specify the domain of applicability. Most psy-
chological theories assume that this domain includes
the whole of humanity. However, even though theo-
ries can vary in the extent to which they are empiric-
ally supported, they can never be proven to be true:
Any aspect of a theory can be challenged. We can
question whether the assumptions made by a theory
about the causal relationship between the various the-
oretical states or events is correct; we can doubt that
the auxiliary hypothesis that link the theoretical con-
cepts to experimental manipulation and/or measures
are valid; finally, we can also question the universality
assumption that our theory applies to all of humanity.
We can point out that experimental subjects with
whom a theory has been tested differ from the rest of
humanity in psychological characteristics that are rele-
vant to the theory in question. Whereas it is not
informative to blindly replicate studies with people
passing through bus terminals, train stations, or air-
ports, or among representatives of different cultures,
theory-guided research with subject populations that
differ from the original research participants in psy-
chological characteristics that are relevant for the the-
ory being tested have resulted in important findings.
Some of this research has indicated that phenom-
ena (e.g., the fundamental attribution bias) assumed
to be cultural universals do in fact vary across selected
cultures or that the extent to which individuals
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conform to unanimous majorities increases with the
collectivist nature of the culture of which the research
participants are members. This is problematic for
inductivists, because it indicates that one cannot gen-
eralize from empirical observations of how people
behave or think in one culture, to thoughts or behav-
iors of members of another culture. As we have
argued, this cultural variance does not pose a problem
for a hypothetico-deductive approach to scientific
research. The important question from a hypothetico-
deductive perspective is not whether psychological
phenomena are culturally invariant but whether the
observed variance can be explained by our psycho-
logical theories. This was definitely the case in the
research examples reviewed earlier.
We would like to avoid the inductivist fallacy to
generalize from our limited knowledge of cross-cultural
research to all of that research or even to research that
will at some point be conducted in the future. Thus,
we can only point out that there is great deal of cross-
cultural evidence that our psychological laws are valid
beyond the student (or more recently MTurk) popula-
tions with whom they have been validated. More
important for the present argument, however, is that
diversifying our subject populations is going to bring
an advance in psychological knowledge only when we
have good theories on why relations among variables
may be different in different populations.
Notes
1. The “replication crisis” refers to the fact that empirical
findings in psychology often do not fare so well in
direct replication studies (e.g., Pashler & Wagenmakers,
2012; Stroebe, 2016; Stroebe & Strack, 2014).
2. For pragmatic reasons and brevity, we use the term
“law” or “psychological law” throughout the article.
However, typically findings in psychology are more
restricted in scope and lack the robustness of the
“laws” in, for example, the natural sciences.
3. Popper’s methodology is controversially discussed in
Lakatos and Musgrave (1970). For a reformulation and
defense of Popper’s view, see Andersson (1994) and
Musgrave (1999).
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